Although, at the time of accession to the EU, organic farming policies formally were equally developed in the Czech Republic and Poland, a closer investigation reveals some variation. This paper takes a policy network perspective to explore the policy differences between these two countries.
INTRODUCTION
Organic agriculture began to develop both in the Czech Republic and in Poland in the early 1990s.
These two countries show many similarities. After the fall of the 'Iron Curtain' they transformed their political systems from socialist to capitalist structures, and are now multi-party parliamentary democratic systems. They are situated in a similar geographical environment and agriculture is faced with similar climatic conditions. The most important trigger for organic farming (policy) development in Poland and the Czech Republic was the accession process to the EU starting in 1997 (Prazan et al., 2004) . From then on, the countries were equally eligible for the same European funds and financial information to the state actors and support policy implementation. The so-formed networks are then part of the context in which individual actors have to take their decisions. Network structures thus represent options and constraints for individual actions (Knoke, 1996) .
A classification of policy networks
From a structural perspective, it is the type of network that influences policy results (Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Rhodes, R.A.W. and Marsh, 1992) . A closed network consisting of a limited number of actors with shared ideology, values, and broad policy preferences will produce a different policy result than a network that is open to numerous interest groups with diverging values and conflicting preferences. Different authors have developed comprehensive network typologies (see e.g. Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Van Waarden, 1992) . The benefit of such typologies is that they offer a useful tool to order and categorize information and to describe and classify policy subsystems which can then be compared with each other, including the question of their influence on policy output. However, comprehensive network typologies are often difficult to apply empirically. On the one hand, the 'dimensions' forming the basis for the categories are sometimes difficult to operationalize, and on the other hand, the complexity of some typologies (e.g. Van Waarden (1992) uses eleven network types) is unsuitable for an empirical analysis (Sciarini, 1995) . For these reasons we follow (Sciarini, 1995; and choose a fairly general classification of networks developed by Kriesi (1994) who distinguishes on the one hand between the structure of interest intermediation -pluralism and corporatism (based on Schmitter, 1982) -and, on the other hand, between a strong and a weak state.
This results in four types of networks: concertation, sector-based cooperation, intervention, and pressure, each with specific expectations regarding the policy output they produce.
In the case of concertation public and private actors are strongly structured, and their number is limited. The network is not very dense, and centralized around the main actors -both private and public ones. Strongly connected subgroups may appear particularly between the peak associations and state bodies. The (hierarchically organized) interest groups manage their conflicts and coordinate their action with that of the government. These groups face limited competition, and are in a position to We follow this promising approach of a 'most similar systems -most different outcome' research design for our purpose of comparing organic farming policy output in the Czech Republic and Poland.
METHODS
As basis for the comparison between the two policy networks, quantitative network analyses were carried out in both countries. To reach a meaningful interpretation of the configuration of structures of the Czech and the Polish organic farming policy networks (as independent variable) and to explore their impact on the policy output (as dependent variable) we will use different network characteristics.
The classification presented above stresses the importance of network density, the number of private and public actors, their structural organization, centrality, and subgroups. Our analysis takes five structural characteristics of networks into account that illustrate these features. In particular, we will consider: i) the size and density of the network, ii) the distribution of capacities between actors and their structural organization, iii) the cohesion of policy preferences (manifest in subgroups and/or conflicting views on organic farming within the network), iv) the relationship between interest groups and the government, including the centrality of the private actors and state bodies, and v) the dominance of one or more policy networks in a policy field, i.e. in our case, the relationship between the organic and the general agriculture policy networks (see Greer, 2002; Greer, 2005; Montpetit, 2005) . In the following, these five network characteristics are explained in more detail.
For a general characterization of the networks, we measured the size, i.e. the number of actors present, and the network density (i). The density thereby is defined as the proportion of links actually established between actors (Kephart, 1950) , and varies between a value of zero and one, usually presented as a percentage value. As indicators for the actors' capacities (ii), we consider their (material and non-material) resources, and the degree of organization, in particular of the organic sector. The cohesion of policy preferences (iii) are characterized in two ways. On the one hand, cohesion manifests itself in subgroups, in network jargon called cliques (i.e. a group of mutually linked actors) (Wasserman and Faust, 1999) . On the other hand, the issue of cohesion is approached by looking at the conflict structure within the networks. Here, we focus on conflicting opinions of the actors about organic farming policy, and analyse their structural equivalence in the conflict network. Through a block modelling procedure actors with a similar relational profile are grouped into one block and the relation between these blocks, or positions, can then be analysed (Burt, 1991; Henning and Wald, 2000) . The relationship between interest groups and the agricultural ministry (iv) is explored through the distribution of power, analysed by the reputation and centrality of the actors. Reputation is defined as the expression of the power of an actor, i.e. the perceived power of an actor to have influence in the network. This is measured as the proportion of interviewees who named an actor as influential in relation to a particular policy (Kriesi, 1980; Sciarini 1996) . The centrality concept considers actors as powerful if they exert an influence on many others. An actor is central when involved (directly or indirectly) in many relations. In our analysis, we concentrate on the betweenness centrality measure, whereby an actor is central if it lies on the shortest link between other actors (the so-called geodesic),
i.e. they have to pass via this actor if they want to interact with each other. A large betweenness centrality signifies that this actor is located between many pairs of actors on their geodesics (Wasserman and Faust, 1999) . For purposes of comparison between networks of different sizes, this measure is standardized by dividing the value reached by the maximum possible value of betweenness centrality. Actors with a high betweenness centrality have the potential to control communication within a network and coordinate group processes (Freeman, 1978/79) . Hence, this measure describes the potential of a network actor to act as information broker and provides information about its overall activity level and influence in the network. Finally, we analyse the relationship between the organic and the general agriculture policy networks (v) by comparing the reputation of the actors in each of the policy areas.
Network interviews were conducted by local researchers in the native language, using a common questionnaire. A combination of the reputational and positional approaches (Sciarini 1996) was applied to identify potential interviewees. First, invitation lists for parliamentary hearings (or any comparable event) on issues of organic farming were consulted and a list of politically active organizations was produced. Researchers then discussed the list with key persons and identified the most important actors in the domain of organic farming policy; more actors were added if necessary.
The final list also included those institutions that are important in the policy process from an institutional point of view. In this way, overall, 13 relevant policy actors in the Czech Republic were identified, and 17 in Poland. The interviewees were drawn from state institutions representing the relevant ministries and/or their departments, from the private sector including general and organic farming organizations, environmental interest groups, market organizations, and from other politically important actors. All interviews were carried out in late 2003 / early 2004 and took about one hour.
After conducting the interviews, the national researchers submitted the interview results in the form of data matrices to the network analyst. A central analysis of the data ensured a common analysis routine and reduced possible measurement errors. The network analysis was carried out with UCINET software (Borgatti et al. 1999) . Visualization of the policy networks was done with Visone software (Brandes & Wagner 2003) , which includes the functionality for graphical representation of actor and network characteristics. The results from the network analysis were written up in country reports and cross-checked with the national experts who had conducted the interviews so as to avoid misinterpretation of the data. To identify the conflict structure in the network, the software application STRUCTURE (Burt 1991) was used. This bases block modelling on hierarchical clustering of the actors (based on the Ward algorithm) and leaves it to the scientist to test the assignments of actors to blocks (Moschitz and Stolze, 2007) .
The organic farming policy output in the two countries is described both in terms of policy content, i.e. their main objectives and the instruments chosen (Sciarini, 1994; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000; Bugdahn, 2005) and the timeliness of transposition from EU policy (Giuliani, 2003; Mastenbroek, 2003) , i.e. the way in which member states formally incorporate EU legislation into their domestic laws (Michelsen, 2008 Policy instruments to support organic farming can be divided into legal, financial or communicative instruments (Van Nispen and Ringeling, 1998) . Legal instruments comprise orders, prohibitions and regulations, while financial instruments are less coercive and more stimulative. By contrast, communicative policy instruments involve some kind of interaction between the state and the civil society, and do not include clear sanctions. Information campaigns or strategic documents are examples for such communicative policy instruments (Michelsen, 2002) . We base our characterization of organic farming policies on the extensive data that Hrabalova et al. (2005) 
236, 2004).

Legal instruments
In the Czech Republic, a first national directive on organic farming based on Council Regulation with non-organic production (from neighbouring fields), and requirements for packaging materials.
The Czech regulation also defined standards for rabbit keeping, aquaculture, viticulture, and for the processing of bee-keeping products, all of which were absent from the then current EU regulation. 
Financial instruments
The Czech government began to provide financial support for organic farming in 1990. However, this financial support stopped in 1992 and funds were available again only from 1998 onwards, this time (Hrabalova et al., 2005) .
Communicative instruments
In the Czech Republic we find a nationwide state logo for selling organic products which is also 
Organic farming policy in Poland
Objectives
In Poland, the objectives of organic farming policy are not stated as clearly as in the Czech Republic.
The only indication of such policy goals may be found in the Rural Development Plan which states that organic farming fulfils environmental goals and creates job opportunities in rural areas (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2004) . (Tyburski and Zakowska-Biemans, 2003) . In order to comply fully with EU legislation, the act was replaced just before accession by the Legal Act of 
Legal instruments
Financial instruments
The Polish government supported the costs of inspection and certification of organic farms from 1998 onwards. Area payments for organic farming (from the second year of conversion on) were introduced in 1999 (Hrabalova et al., 2005; Metera, 2005) (Hrabalova et al., 2005) .
Communicative instruments
No state logo exists in Poland, and the two private logos are not used nationwide, whereas a few regional programmes for organic farming development have been established since 2002. Until the accession to the EU, no national Action Plan targeting organic farming had been set up 3 .
Comparison of the Czech and the Polish organic farming policy output
We can conclude that for organic farming policies in both Poland and the Czech Republic, the EU principles and objectives of contributing to environmental quality and cutting excess food production (European Commission, 2000) are relevant, since the national laws are an implementation of EU legislation. Additionally, both countries emphasize organic farming as a source of jobs in rural areas as a reason for supporting this form of land management.
Although both national policies are now equivalent to European law, the Czech organic farming policy is more elaborate than the Polish. Until 2003, the Czech government assigned significantly more funds to organic farming, whereas in Poland substantial organic farming payments started only when they were included in the new rural development plan in the framework of the EU funded rural development programme. Poland has since caught up and, in 2004, the average support for organically farmed land was even higher than in the Czech Republic. An Action Plan on Organic Farming, including clear objectives, has been developed only in the Czech Republic, but not in Poland.
As to timeliness, the Czech government adopted European law much earlier and developed an organic farming policy prior to the accession process to the EU, and its Action Plan had been approved even prior to the EU Action Plan on Organic Farming. In Poland organic farming policy was developed only after the accession process had started.
In sum, the Czech organic farming policy is more elaborate in its content (described by legal, financial and communicative instruments) and has been developed earlier than the Polish organic farming policy. After having presented the organic farming policies in the Czech Republic and Poland, in the following section the organic farming policy networks in the two countries are compared, before we discuss the contribution of the network perspective to explaining policy variation.
COMPARISON OF THE ORGANIC FARMING POLICY NETWORK IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND POLAND
The network analysis focussed on the network question 'With whom do you work together or stay in regular contact in order to exchange your views on organic farming policy?' Figures 1a and 1b visualize the Czech and the Polish organic farming policy network with the help of Visone software (Brandes and Wagner, 2003) .
Figures 1a and 1b about here
Network size and density
As Table 1 shows, the Czech organic farming policy network consists of 13 actors. A high proportion of the network actors are private organizations from the organic sector (the organic farming organizations PRO BIO and LIBERA, the association of organic farm advisors EPOS, the inspection and certification body KEZ and the organic market actors COLIFE and GREMA). Only one of the three organizations oriented predominantly towards mainstream farming (the Czech Agrarian Chamber AKCZR) is connected to the network, whereas the farmers' union (ZSCZR) and the association of the food industries (PKCZR) do not closely collaborate with any of the other network members. In addition to the Ministry of Agriculture (MZECZR) which plays a prominent role in the network, the Ministry of Environment (MZPCZR) is also involved in organic farming policy making in the Czech Republic. On average, each actor established 2.1 relations with other actors, resulting in a network density of about 17%, i.e. less than one-fifth of the possible links between actors are present.
The Polish organic farming policy network is larger than the Czech one, and includes 17 actors. In contrast to the Czech network, there are no market actors, more than half of the network actors are state institutions and administrative bodies, and one third are private actors. Only a few actors are oriented towards organic farming. Remarkably, the two organic farming organizations (EKOLAND and EKOGAL) play a minor role in the network, whereas the centre is occupied by a mainstreamoriented administrative body, the National Council of Agricultural Chambers (KRIR), and the Institute for Sustainable Development (INER), an actor with an indifferent attitude towards organic farming.
As in the Czech Republic, the mainstream farmers' union (KZRKIOR) is only loosely connected to the network. On average, the actors in the Polish network have established more links to each other than in the Czech network, namely 2.8, and the network density amounts to 17.7%.
Table 1 about here
Distribution of capacities
In both countries, the organic farming organizations have poor financial and personnel resources at their disposal for the purpose of engaging in policy making (Moschitz et al., 2004) . They are confronted with state actors whose role in the political process is institutionalized, so the distribution of capacities is clearly skewed towards these institutions. All the same, interest groups may build their political engagement upon the considerable level of commitment of their members. If they are able to organise and concentrate the interests of a sector they can build up power and reach a position to bargain with the state. Here, the Czech organic farming sector is in an advantageous position. In the Czech Republic, organic farmers are unified to a large extent under one organic farming organization, PRO BIO, of which about 50% of all organic farmers are members, whereas in Poland only about 10% of organic farmers are organized in one of the three organic farming organizations which are scattered across the country and which compete, to some extent, for members and influence (Moschitz et al. 2004 ).
Cohesion of policy preferences
Cohesion in a network can be described through cohesive subgroups, such as cliques (i.e. a group of mutually linked actors) (Wasserman and Faust, 1999) . Whereas no such subgroup exists in the Polish In addition to analysing subgroups, we were interested in the level of conflict in the networks, i.e. the extent to which diverging opinions about organic farming exist (Sciarini et al., 2004) . Therefore, the questionnaire included a question on convergent and divergent views on organic farming in relation to the other actors, whereby convergence was coded as "1", divergence as "-1" and neither nor as "0".
The average level of conflict is positive in both networks, but is higher in the Czech case (0.12) than in Poland. In the Czech Republic, the inspection body KEZ forms one camp together with PRO BIO and the Ministry of Agriculture. They share opinions on organic farming with each other while declaring divergent views from the "mainstream" network actors (see Table 2 ). By contrast, in Poland we find a high level of indifference, which indicates that organic farming does not play an important role for most of the actors in the network (see Table 3 ).
Table 2 about here
In both Table 2 and 3, each cell gives the average relation from someone occupying position I (given in the row) to someone in position J (given in the column). The relationship between interest groups and the agricultural ministry is further illustrated by the distribution of power, analysed through the centrality and reputation of the actors. In the Czech network, the most central actor (on the 'betweenness centrality' measure) is PRO BIO, who also scores highly on the reputational power measure (see the left column in Table 4 ). The agricultural ministry has a high reputation for influencing organic farming policy; however, its betweenness centrality is limited. Thus, organic farming policy in the Czech Republic is dominated by the organic farming organization.
Table 4 about here
In Poland, the most central actor is the National Council of Agricultural Chambers (KRIR), an administrative body; another environmental organization (INER) which works in organic farming, among other issues, is also fairly central. Remarkably, all of the organic farming organizations have a zero score for betweenness centrality. Although the Agricultural Ministry has a low betweenness centrality score, it is the only actor with a reasonable reputational power (i.e. a score higher than 50%)
for influencing organic farming policy (see the left column in Table 5) In the Czech Republic, organic farming represents a distinctive policy field. Apart from the Agricultural Ministry which has an institutional role, no actor is seen as influential both on organic farming policy and on general agricultural policy. Organic sector organizations dominate the organic farming policy network, whereas the mainstream farming institutions and organizations influence the general agricultural policy network. In Poland, too, the Agricultural Ministry is powerful in both policy networks for institutional reasons. But, in contrast to the Czech case, its power in organic farming policy is not balanced by organic farming organizations. In consequence, organic farming policy is not clearly distinct from general agricultural policy, and both policy areas are dominated by the Agricultural Ministry. The results from block modelling, as shown above, support this finding.
Summary: brief comparison of the Czech and the Polish organic farming policy network
Comparing the Czech and the Polish organic farming policy network, we can see that the Czech network is smaller, i.e. fewer policy actors are relevant to the shaping of organic farming policy. By contrast, Polish organic farming policy is shaped by a larger number of actors and a strong state.
Overall, the policy actors are less engaged in the policy-making process. The difficulties caused by the lack of financial resources which organic farming interest groups in both countries face are reduced in the Czech network by a strongly unified organic sector committed to political action. In Poland, organic farming organizations are scattered across the country, and conflicts among them hamper collective political action. The most remarkable difference between the two networks is the clear preference for organic farming in the Czech network in contrast to the prevailing indifference towards organic farming in the Polish network. Not only are many more organic actors involved in organic farming policy making in the Czech Republic, but the most central position is also taken by the organic farming organization, giving it a strong position vis-à-vis the government. In Poland, the organic farming organizations have not managed to become recognized as important policy actors in the network. In sum, the Czech organic farming policy network comes close to a concertation network type as it has been characterized at the beginning of this paper. By contrast, the Polish organic farming policy network can be characterized as intervention type (Kriesi, 1994) . In addition, the organic farming policy network is distinct from the general farming network in the Czech Republic whereas in Poland organic farming is strongly influenced by the general farming policy network.
The following section uses the comparison of the policy networks in the two countries to show how the different themes of network analysis contribute to explaining the variation in these policy outputs.
THE RELATION BETWEEN NETWORKS AND OUTPUT
Organic farming is widely preferred in the Czech network. A large number of organic actors are members of the network, but the organic sector is well organized and has successfully used its capacity of a common identity in the policy-making process. It has established a relatively strong position vis-à-vis the state bodies. Evidence for this success could be found at various occasions. From the early 1990s on, just after the breakdown of the socialist system, organic farming interest groups lobbied for an organic farming legislation, including financial support, which became available for a first time from 1990 to 1992. The organic sector organizations were also successful in promoting the export of organic products into the EU by lobbying for a control and certification body as a public benefit organization which was a prerequisite for approval to the list of third countries provided for in By contrast, in Poland the organic sector is less equipped for political action, and much less organized, while being confronted with a political environment that is less clear towards organic farming issues.
The political discourse on organic farming has been triggered out of a need to comply with developments at the EU level rather than in response to domestic pressure from an interest group. The organic farming interest groups have not succeeded in establishing a clear position vis-à-vis the state bodies that would be recognized by the latter. In consequence, the organic farming policy in Poland is much more state driven than in the Czech Republic. At the same time, organic farming is not a high priority on the political agenda of the Polish Agricultural Ministry (Moschitz et al., 2004) .
CONCLUSION
Applying a "most similar systems -most different outcome" research design, this paper has shown how the common themes of network analysis we used to illustrate the structural characteristics of networks can contribute to explaining variation in policy output. In particular, the size and density of the network, the distribution of capacities between actors and their structural organization, the cohesion of policy preferences, and the relationship between interest groups and the government proved to be relevant.
In the concertation-type organic farming policy network of the Czech Republic organic farming policy is discussed mainly between the government and the major organic farming organization to which the organic interest groups have delegated the competence to politically represent the whole sector. Hence, the organic sector acts as a cohesive group and defends a clear position towards the state bodies. It is thus able to counterbalance the institutionalized power of the government. Consequently, the organic farming organizations experience difficulties in becoming heard and establishing a clear position against the government. Given such a network, the little interest of the dominating (state) actor in organic farming explains why organic farming policy is less elaborate in Poland than in the Czech Republic.
Admittedly, the static tool of network analysis produces a picture of one specific moment in a policy process. However, relatively young policy fields, such as organic farming policy in the new EU member states, are in general fairly dynamic and prone to change. Different actors may take the central position at different times and determine the prevailing discourse and preferences in a network.
Thus, other organic farming policy networks in the new EU member states or, at some other point in time, the networks described here may lie somewhere between the two 'extreme' cases (in terms of policy output) presented in this paper. 
